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Shining a Light on the Shadow-of-Trial Model: A 
Bridge Between Discounting and Plea 
Bargaining 
Lauren Clatch∗ 
We don’t see very far in the future. We are very focused on one 
idea at a time, one problem at a time and all these are incompat-
ible with full rationality as economic theory assumes it. –Daniel 
Kahneman1 
 
Phillip Bivens, accused of raping and killing a woman in 
Mississippi in 1979, was confronted with this choice: take the 
bargain of life in prison, or go to trial and face the death penalty.2 
After three decades in prison, Bivens was exonerated in 2010 by 
DNA tests conducted by the Innocence Project in New Orleans.3 
Why would Bivens, who was factually innocent, plead guilty to a 
crime he did not commit and forgo his constitutional right to a 
trial? How can this be explained? Bivens’s choice may be deemed 
rational because his choice was between life, albeit life in prison, 
and death. But what about defendants confronted with life in 
prison or twenty years in prison—why would an innocent de-
fendant plead guilty then? 
 
∗  J.D.-Ph.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School and 
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lege of Criminal Justice; B.A. 2013, Washington University in St. Louis. Thank 
you to those who provided feedback throughout the writing process, especially 
Dr. Eugene Borgida, Professor JaneAnne Murray, Caroline Bressman, Trevor 
Matthews, Dion Farganis, Hannah Nelson, and Professor Kevin Reitz. Thank 
you to my mentors at Washington University, Dr. Sandra Hale and Dr. Joel 
Myerson, who emboldened me to apply cognitive psychology to legal decision-
making. Special thanks to my friends and family for supporting me in all my 
endeavors, especially my decision to pursue a joint degree. Copyright © 2017 by 
Lauren Clatch. 
 1. ‘Fast and Slow’: Pondering the Speed of Thought, NPR (Oct. 19, 2011), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=141508854.  
 2. Phillip Bivens, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
cases/phillip-bivens (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). 
 3. Id. 
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The Innocence Project has exonerated 351 individuals by 
DNA evidence, and thirty-eight of the exonerees accepted a plea 
bargain.4 There is no well-documented and unifying explanation 
for innocents that plead guilty, but intuitive hypotheses include 
coercion, attorney malpractice, and/or defendant incompetence. 
Despite this “innocence problem,”5 plea bargaining is extremely 
prevalent. 
As Brown and Bunnell note, “[p]lea bargaining is a defining, 
if not the defining, feature of the present federal criminal justice 
system.”6 In 2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported 
75,573 federal criminal cases, of which approximately ninety-
five percent were disposed of by a guilty plea, or plea bargain.7 
These high plea-bargain rates in federal cases are not qualita-
tively different from those in state cases.8 Criminal sanctions, 
which by definition often involve the loss of liberty, are the 
harshest sanctions society uses to deter and punish behavior. 
 
 4. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2017); see also As United States Exonerations Rise, Role of Guilty Pleas 
in Generating Wrongful Convictions Scrutinized, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Feb. 17, 
2016), http://www.innocenceproject.org/as-united-states-exonerations-rise-role 
-of-guilty-pleas-in-generating-wrongful-convictions-scrutinized (discussing the 
case of an Ohio man who pleaded guilty to a crime for which he was later exon-
erated). There are likely more than thirty-eight innocent defendants who ac-
cepted a plea bargain because the Innocence Project cannot feasibly take on all 
cases, or exonerate all innocent clients using DNA evidence. In short, these sta-
tistics are likely gross underestimates of the actual innocence problem in plea 
bargaining. 
 5. See Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the 
Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 353–54 (2006) (discussing the problem of innocent 
defendants accepting plea bargains and referring to it as the “innocence prob-
lem”); Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Di-
lemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2–5 (2013) (discussing the prevalent problem 
of innocent defendants admitting guilt in order to avoid a harsher punishment).  
 6. Mary P. Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial 
Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 7. LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (Jan. 24, 
2011), http://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf. 
 8. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTI-
CAL TABLES 1 (rev. ed. Nov. 22, 2010) (stating that ninety-four percent of felony 
offenders sentenced in state court pleaded guilty); Bill Mears, Justices Say De-
fendants Who Get Bad Advice on Plea Bargains Deserve Relief, CNN (Mar. 21, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/21/justice/scotus-plea-bargains/index.html 
(“97% of federal convictions and 94% of state convictions . . . stem from guilty 
pleas.”). 
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Noting this reality, William Blackstone coined the well-known 
maxim: “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than one 
innocent suffer.”9 The prevalence and centrality of plea bargain-
ing in the criminal justice system and the documented innocence 
problem provokes a broader question: what factors other than 
innocence or guilt affect criminal defendants’ decisions to accept 
a plea or go to trial? Presumably, defendants’ innocence (or guilt) 
is one of the factors that influences their decisions, but the fact 
that there is an innocence problem suggests that innocence is 
being outweighed by other factors. 
The traditional explanation of plea bargain decision-making 
is that all criminal defendants make their decisions by compar-
ing the consequences associated with accepting the plea to the 
consequences associated with going to trial and losing.10 The 
plea bargain offers the reception of a reduced criminal charge 
(for example, felony to gross misdemeanor) and/or reduced sen-
tence (for example, one year in prison to one month in prison).11 
This charge-sentence discount is bargained for between the de-
fense attorney and prosecutor.12 In the case of a guilty defend-
ant, the reasoning is relatively straightforward: Why risk a more 
serious charge and/or a harsher sentence? However, it is not 
clear why an innocent defendant would nonetheless plead guilty. 
For them, the charge-sentence discount is almost moot, because 
if the world were perfectly just the charges would be dropped or 
the defendant could go to trial and be acquitted. So why forgo the 
only chance to be rightfully freed at trial unless the perceived 
chances of freedom after trial are low? Ironically for innocent de-
fendants, a plea bargain is a perverse deal. If accepted, an inno-
cent is convicted of their own volition. Contemplating an inno-
cent defendant’s choice makes it clear that the perceived 
probability of conviction at trial features strongly in criminal de-
fendants’ decision-making process, so the traditional model of 
plea bargain decision-making that focuses mostly on the charge-
sentence discount is too simplistic. 
These thought experiments about criminal defendants’ ra-
tionality and preferences are common in legal scholarship on 
 
 9. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. 
 10. Supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Plea Bargain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 12. The term charge-sentence discount is used to allow for the possibility 
that sentence, charge, or charge and sentence reductions are negotiated in dif-
ferent instances. 
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plea bargaining.13 Even though they produce testable hypothe-
ses, experimental and empirical tests of these ideas have been 
slow to proliferate.14 Beginning in the 1980s, researchers have 
completed a few studies that test legal scholars’ hypotheses 
about plea bargaining.15 Until there is experimental evidence 
identifying which factors affect criminal defendants’ plea bar-
gain decisions, the field is left with legal scholars’ educated 
guesses. 
This Note describes two separate literatures: plea bargain-
ing in legal scholarship and discounting in behavioral economics. 
Developments in the literature suggest the beginnings of a con-
ceptual bridge between the two fields; legal scholars have called 
for empirical and experimental demonstrations of plea bargain 
decision-making models to challenge the traditional law and eco-
nomics model of plea bargaining,16 and behavioral economics re-
searchers have moved past financial decision-making to contexts 
 
 13. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 14. An experimental research study means that an experiment was con-
ducted and the aim of experimental research is to identify cause-and-effect re-
lationships by direct manipulation of an independent, or predictor, variable. See 
DAVID R. BONIFACE, EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND STATISTICAL METHODS FOR BE-
HAVIOURAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 4–5 (1995) (discussing experimental re-
search). Empirical research studies, on the other hand, do not necessarily ma-
nipulate anything, but rather only observe a phenomenon and make use of 
numbers to describe the results. See id. at 128 (discussing empirical research 
methods). 
 15. See, e.g., Henry H. Rossman et al., Some Patterns and Determinants of 
Plea-Bargaining Decisions: A Simulation and Quasi-Experiment, in PLEA BAR-
GAINING 77 (William F. McDonald & James A. Cramer eds., 1980) (considering 
factors that may predict outcomes in plea bargaining decision-making); Shawn 
D. Bushway et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the 
Trial,” 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014) (modeling the shadow-of-trial model using 
survey responses from defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges); Shawn D. 
Bushway & Allison D. Redlich, Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” 
a Mirage?, 28 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2012) (finding zero or a neg-
ative impact of evidentiary factors on probability of conviction); Hunter A. McAl-
lister & Norman J. Bregman, Plea Bargaining by Prosecutors and Defense At-
torneys: A Decision Theory Approach, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 686 (1986) 
[hereinafter McAllister & Bregman (Plea Bargaining)] (evaluating the impact 
of sentence severity and conviction probability on plea bargaining).  
 16. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2530 (2004) (“The size of each variable may be uncertain, 
but that is not a good reason to set each variable at zero. Rather, this difficulty 
should spur empirical research to measure these [demographic] factors. Though 
there are many empirical studies on negotiating civil settlements, very few exist 
on the criminal side.”). 
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with less tangible commodities.17 However, interdisciplinary ex-
perimental research on plea bargain decision-making is still 
lacking. Moreover, the nature of the plea bargain decision op-
tions—plead guilty, which is certain and immediate, or go to 
trial, which is uncertain and delayed—lends itself to be studied 
using the discounting paradigms, which ask participants to 
choose between two options with similar differences (that is, ex-
tent of delay and certainty). Furthermore, the strong influence 
of law and economics on plea bargaining scholarship makes be-
havioral economics paradigms like discounting particularly 
promising because the fields are conceptually connected.  
In order to address these gaps in the scholarship, this Note 
proposes the use of experimental discounting paradigms to test 
the influence of two features that are underemphasized by the 
traditional law and economics model: delay to trial and probabil-
ity of conviction. But first, Part I summarizes the two disparate 
literatures: the behavioral economics literature and the legal 
scholarship on plea bargaining. Part II takes a critical look at 
interdisciplinary scholarship, concluding that the lack of experi-
mental and empirical frameworks that center on criminal de-
fendant decision-making has prevented an integrative under-
standing of plea bargaining. Part III connects discounting to plea 
bargaining and suggest that delay and probability discounting 
paradigms provide a good first step to understanding and exper-
imentally testing scholars’ hypotheses about how criminal de-
fendants make plea bargain decisions. This Note argues that le-
gal scholars and legislatures will be in a better position to 
develop an integrated and coherent evaluation of the fairness of 
plea bargaining once there is experimental evidence demonstrat-
ing what factors affect defendants’ plea bargain decisions. If dis-
counting is at work in plea bargaining, a plea bargain decision 
may be presenting defendants, including innocent ones like 
Philip Bivens, with an unjust choice; admit guilt and accept a 
satisfyingly immediate and certain sentence or pursue the right 
to trial and face uncertainty and risk. Experimental data is the 
key to understanding the effect of these psychological forces on 
individual defendants as well as the criminal justice system as a 
whole. 
 
 17. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
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I.  TWO SEPARATE LITERATURES: PLEA BARGAINING 
AND DISCOUNTING   
Despite the volume of scholarship on plea bargaining,18 
there remain unanswered questions. Specifically, no scholar has 
satisfactorily described, explained, and proven which factors in-
fluence criminal defendants’ plea bargain decisions. There are at 
least two reasons for this: (1) legal theory has not been satisfac-
torily supported by experimental evidence; and (2) experimental 
work has not satisfactorily addressed the question of criminal 
defendant decision-making, using instead judges and attorneys 
as participants. This disconnect may be rectified by an experi-
mental paradigm driven by legal scholars’ hypotheses but focus-
ing on criminal defendant decision-making, rather than other le-
gal actors like attorneys. 
To demonstrate the utility of an experimental paradigm, it 
is necessary to first canvas the landscape of the current scholar-
ship. This Part describes two disparate literatures that, if con-
nected, may answer the unanswered questions. Section A de-
scribes discounting, its place between the disciplines of cognitive 
psychology and traditional economics, and the utility of discount-
ing studies in describing human decision-making. Section B 
summarizes the legal scholarship on plea bargaining. Section C 
suggests that, conceptually and theoretically, the two separate 
scholarships, discounting and plea bargaining, have edged closer 
in the last decade due to seminal work by Stephanos Bibas.19 
A. THE HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF DISCOUNTING 
This Section provides a concise history of the development 
of behavioral economics, a description of the behavioral econom-
ics concept of discounting, and an explanation of the detailed 
procedure used to measure discounting. The following Subsec-
tions place discounting in the context of its home discipline and 
describe what questions discounting answers. 
1. Behavioral Economics: At the Intersection of Economics, 
Cognitive Psychology, and Mathematics 
The concept of discounting has its home in the field of be-
havioral economics, which is a discipline influenced by tradi-
 
 18. See supra note 15 (listing scholarship on plea bargaining).  
 19. See generally Bibas, supra note 16 (arguing that a “structural-psycho-
logical perspective” must be added to the shadow-of-trial model). 
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tional economic theories, cognitive psychology, and mathemat-
ics. Traditional economic models, often called models of utility 
maximization,20 regard humans as rational, and accordingly re-
quire the decision-maker to consider every possible action.21 Not 
every scholar has agreed with the description of humans as util-
ity-maximizing, rational beings. For example, Herbert Simon, a 
Nobel Prize winner in economics, was fiercely critical of the ra-
tional man, and suggested that traditional economic theories 
were computationally unrealistic because they required more 
calculation ability than human minds actually have.22 Relying 
on Simon’s criticisms of economics,23 the core belief of behavioral 
economics is that “increasing the realism of the psychological un-
derpinnings of economic analysis will improve the field of eco-
nomics on its own terms—generating theoretical insights, mak-
ing better predictions of field phenomena, and suggesting better 
policy.”24 Thus behavioral economics is a discipline situated be-
 
 20. See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003) (discussing utility 
maximization as a traditional economic model).  
 21. See Thomas D. Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision 
Making, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 542, 543 (Susan T. Fiske et al. 
eds., 5th ed. 2010) (discussing a critique of the traditional economic model based 
on the premise that “full economic rationality” is unrealistic).  
 22. Id.; see also Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 
69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 101 (1955) (stating there are limits on the “computational 
capacity” of the human mind); Herbert A. Simon, Invariants of Human Behav-
ior, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (1990) (stating humans’ short-term memory is 
limited). Later, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky revolutionized cognitive 
psychology, arguing that cognitive processes involved in decision-making should 
mirror the processes and principles of visual attention and perception. See Gi-
lovich & Griffin, supra note 21, at 544–46 (discussing Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work and stating it has come to define the field). Following the cognitive illusion 
paradigm, their approach was to test judgment in environments that resulted 
in clear errors. Id. at 545. Their work established the concept of judgmental 
heuristics, and they identified three general purpose heuristics: (1) availability; 
(2) representativeness; and (3) anchoring. Id. at 548–54. Herbert Simon is also 
regarded as a cognitive psychologist that helped move psychology from an em-
phasis on behaviorism to an emphasis on the mental processes that go on inside 
individuals’ minds. See ROBERT J. STERNBERG ET AL., SCIENTISTS MAKING A 
DIFFERENCE 4 (2016) (stating psychologists such as Simon revolutionized the 
field by suggesting psychology “had to start over” and by emphasizing a focus 
on the mental “processes that go on inside the head”). 
 23. Although Simon was not alone in criticizing traditional economic as-
sumptions of rationality, he is a notable example. See NICK WILKINSON & MAT-
THIAS KLAES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 14 (2d ed. 2012) 
(noting the influence of Simon, Kahneman, and Tversky). 
 24. Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, 
Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIOR ECONOMICS 3, 3 (Colin F. Camerer 
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tween the psychology of economic decision-making and the eco-
nomics of human decision-making25—meaning that researchers 
utilize psychological insight to inform mathematical models of 
human decision-making about economically relevant behaviors.  
2. What is Discounting? 
The term discounting describes an individual’s subjective 
devaluation of a specific option, evidenced by the acceptance of 
one option over the devalued option. For example, if someone is 
offered an apple or an orange, if s/he chooses the apple, one 
might infer a preference for the apple, or conversely a devalua-
tion of the orange. In most discounting studies, however, the 
choice is not between fruit options, but rather between two val-
ues of money.26 
Discounting researchers have focused on two types of dis-
counting, named after the respective source of, or reason for, an 
individual’s discounting: delay and probability.27 For example, 
in delay discounting of fruit, a choice may be between a bruised 
 
et al. eds., 2004). Notably, work in behavioral economics has earned scholars 
the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. Both Daniel Kahneman and Richard H. 
Thaler, the most recent Prize winner, contributed to economics through their 
use of behavioral economics. Interview by Adam Smith with Richard H. Thaler, 
2017 Laureate in Economic Sciences, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
economic-sciences/laureates/2017/thaler-interview.html (last visited Dec. 3, 
2017) (“Richard H. Thaler describes some of the impacts of his work on behav-
ioural economics in this telephone interview recorded immediately after the 
public announcement of the award of his Prize in Economic Sciences. He also 
explains the concept of the ‘nudge’, and looks forward to being in Stockholm 
again with his old friend Daniel Kahneman, Laureate in Economic Sciences 
from 2002.”). 
 25. The question of what broader discipline in which behavioral economics 
sits is complicated and varies based on the research question of particular stud-
ies. Knowing what disciplines are implicated in the behavioral economics para-
digms is important to understand how this Note begins to connect the two dis-
parate literatures. 
 26. See, e.g., Wanjiang Du et al., Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Discount-
ing Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards, 52 PSYCHOL. REC. 479, 483–84 (2002) 
(discussing a study which forced participants to choose between different values 
of money); Leonard Green & Joel Myerson, A Discounting Framework for Choice 
with Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 769, 775 (2004) 
(listing a number of studies dealing with money). 
 27. See, e.g., Matthew W. Johnson & Warren K. Bickel, Within-Subject 
Comparison of Real and Hypothetical Money Rewards in Delay Discounting, 
77 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 129, 129 (2002) (“Delay discounting im-
plies that the value of a reward declines with increasing delay.”); Jerry B. Rich-
ards et al., Delay or Probability Discounting in a Model of Impulsive Behavior: 
Effect of Alcohol, 71 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 121, 121 (1999) (“[T]he 
value of a probabilistic reward decreases as its probability decreases.”). 
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apple now or an undamaged apple in one week. In probability 
discounting of fruit, a choice may be between a 100% chance of 
receiving a bruised apple or a sixty percent chance of receiving 
an undamaged apple (with a forty percent chance of receiving 
nothing at all). In the former example, the differences between 
the options are a difference in the apple offered and the time un-
til receipt (immediate versus delayed); and in the latter example, 
the differences are a difference in the apple offered and proba-
bility of receiving the apple (100% certainty versus less than 
100% probability of receipt). Thus the names delay and probabil-
ity discounting describe the patterns of choices individuals make 
under those conditions—most individuals choose the damaged 
apple option, demonstrating that they devalue the undamaged 
apple because of its association with delay or uncertainty.28  
Delay discounting is the human cognitive preference for im-
mediate, as opposed to delayed, options.29 This is because, in 
general, research has shown that individuals choose the imme-
diate receipt of the bruised apple over the delayed option of the 
objectively more appealing, undamaged apple. Probability dis-
counting is the human cognitive preference for certain, as op-
posed to uncertain, outcomes, because, in general, individuals 
choose the certain (100%) receipt of the slightly less desirable 
apple over the uncertain option of the better apple. Accordingly, 
in both situations, individuals seem to discount, or set aside as 
less important, the actual condition of the apple, focusing in-
stead on the difference in delay or probability between the two 
options. Because there are two differences between the two op-
tions (condition of the apple and extent of delay/probability) with 
the less desirable fruit condition combined with the more desir-
able extent of delay/probability, the trends in individuals’ re-
sponses suggest that the feature of delay/probability is of special 
importance in their decisions.30 
 
 28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 29. See, e.g., Joel Myerson et al., Area Under the Curve As a Measure of 
Discounting, 76 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 235, 236 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Myerson et al. (2001)] (discussing ways to “conceptualiz[e] the choice be-
tween immediate and delayed rewards”). 
 30. Id. at 235 (“[T]he value of a reward . . . decreases as a function of de-
lay.”).  
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3. What Procedure Is Used to Assess Discounting? A Series of 
Binary Choices 
In a traditional behavioral economics or cognitive psychol-
ogy paradigm, researchers test people’s degree of delay discount-
ing by giving participants a series of two choices.31 Figure 1 




Participants are given a first choice (for example, receiving 
$10 now or $15 in one week32), and depending on what they pick, 
 
 31. See, e.g., Leonard Green et al., Temporal Discounting in Choice Between 
Delayed Rewards: The Role of Age and Income, 11 PSYCHOL. & AGING 79, 80 
(1996) (“Participants made a series of choices between hypothetical amounts of 
money, a smaller amount available immediately and a larger amount available 
after a delay.”). 
 32. There is an ongoing and robust debate about gains versus losses in the 
discounting literature, but for convenience and clarity only gains, or receipt of 
a commodity, are used in the examples. For a sampling of the robust debate 
about gains versus losses, see Sara J. Estle et al., Differential Effects of Amount 
on Temporal and Probability Discounting of Gains and Losses, 34 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 914, 918, 920 (2006) (finding that losses were associated with less 
reliable effects of discounting than gains, but the same “hyperbola-like” function 
described both gains and losses); Joel Myerson et al., Individual Differences in 
Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains, but Qualitative 
with Losses, 30 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 359, 367 (2016) [hereinafter My-
erson et al. (2016)] (finding that for losses participants’ responses differed based 
on impulsivity with a considerable portion of participants choosing to pay money 
later rather than immediately). Moreover, some researchers have not found cor-
relations between losses and gains. See, e.g., Christine R. Harris, Feelings of 
Dread and Intertemporal Choice, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 13, 24 (2012) 
(discussing “the absence of any detectable correlation across participants” who 
were choosing between a preferred time to experience “shock”). David J. 
Hardisty and Elke U. Weber found mixed evidence of correlational relationships 
between gains and losses that depended on the commodity being compared (e.g., 
money versus air quality). See David J. Hardisty & Elke U. Weber, Discounting 
Future Green: Money Versus the Environment, 138 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
329, 336 (2009) (discussing the correlation between the different studies exam-
ined). Given the mixed findings, future work should be sensitive to impulsivity 
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the immediate outcome either decreases or increases. So, if the 
participant picks $10 now, the next set of options may be $9 now 
or $15 in one week, and if the participant picks $15 in one week, 
the next set of options may be $11 now or $15 in one week. Thus, 
the immediate option’s monetary value fluctuates (option B in 
Figure 1) to be more or less appealing with the goal that eventu-
ally the participant switches his/her choice. For example, if a 
participant picked the $10 now option, the immediate option 
would decrease (first to $9 as seen in Figure 1) until the partici-
pant decides it is worth waiting a week for the $15. On the other 
hand, if a participant picked the $15, the $10 would increase un-
til the participant decides a slight decrease in monetary value is 
worth getting the money immediately.  
This switch from the penultimate option to the last option 
suggests the presence of an indifference point. An indifference 
point is the point at which a participant does not have a prefer-
ence for either of the two choices.33 This indifference point is pre-
sumed in discounting studies to be the average of the last two 
immediate options.34 For example, using the values above, if a 
participant were to choose $15 in one week rather than $10 now 
(choosing the delayed choice), but then when confronted with the 
choice between $11 now or $15 in one week, the participant 
 
as an individual difference as well as the type of commodity being used. Even if 
there is a true difference between the way people process—and discount—gains 
versus losses, the discounting paradigms are still useful to describe losses. How-
ever, it is not a foregone conclusion that criminal charges and sentences as com-
modities are losses—it may depend largely on a defendant’s perception of 
his/her own innocence or guilt. If discounting paradigms are applied to plea bar-
gaining, the findings may not match the simple hypothesis that individuals de-
sire immediate and certain outcomes. In that case, there would be many varia-
bles that researchers would need to assess to understand those disparate 
findings, and the characterization of criminal charge-sentences as either gains 
or losses would be one of those variables. Other important variables would in-
clude the consequentiality or salience of the commodity, the defendant’s percep-
tion of his/her own innocence/guilt, whether the defendant was out on bail or in 
jail while the plea was bargained for, and the defendant’s perception of the crim-
inal justice system. 
 33. Another name for indifference points is subjective values. See Leonard 
Green et al., Amount of Reward Has Opposite Effects on Discounting of Delayed 
and Probabilistic Outcomes, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 418, 419 (1999) 
(“The subjective value was calculated as the average of the value at which the 
participant switched preference from the immediate . . . reward to the delayed 
. . . reward . . . .”). 
 34. Id. However, there are other defensible methods for creating indiffer-
ence points. See, e.g., Richards et al., supra note 27, at 126 (“The amount of 
immediate certain money the participant judged to be equivalent to the $10 re-
ward was taken to indicate the subjective value of the delayed or uncertain re-
wards.”). 
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switches and selects $11 now (the immediate choice), the indif-
ference point is presumed (for ease) to be 10.5 (the average of ten 
and eleven).35  
Mean or median indifference points are then graphed to 
demonstrate that as the delay increases, the immediate value a 
participant is willing to accept decreases.36 For example, if of-
fered $155 now or $500 in thirty months, participants have been 
shown to prefer $155 now, but when everything is the same ex-
cept the delay is increased to sixty months,37 participants are 
willing to accept as low as $90 now.38 This is evidence that par-
ticipants discount (deem less weighty or important) the value of 
the $500 when delay increases. Importantly, the graphical rep-
resentations of discounting are not linear functions, but rather 
are hyperbolic curves.39 
In a traditional behavioral economics or cognitive psychol-
ogy paradigm, testing people’s degree of probability discounting 
entails—once again—giving study participants a series of two 
choices, except probability is substituted for delay. Figure 2 
shows the two paths participants may take. 
 
 35. See Green et al., supra note 33. 
 36. See Myerson et al. (2001), supra note 29, at 242 fig.5. 
 37. Note that in this example, there would be two indifference points being 
graphed—one for the decision tree with a thirty-month delay and one for the 
decision tree with a sixty-month delay. A common execution of the titration pro-
cedure changes only the immediate dollar value and nothing else within each 
decision tree. See Du et al., supra note 26, at 484 (discussing an experiment in 
which the immediate dollar value decreased while the length of delay and the 
delayed dollar value remained the same). 
 38. See id. at 486–90 (discussing the results of the experiment). 
 39. Leonard Green et al., Rate of Temporal Discounting Decreases with 
Amount of Reward, 25 MEMORY & COGNITION 715, 717–18 (1997). See the fig-
ures on page 718, showing that the hyperbolic curve displayed with a solid line 
fits the data better than the exponential curve displayed by a dotted line. A 
straight line would fit the data even worse than the exponential curve—that is, 
the sum of the squared vertical distances from the data points to the exponential 
curve would be less than the sum of the squared vertical distances from the data 
points to a straight line. This differentiation between linear and curvilinear 
functions to describe discounting is important because the law and economics 
functions proposed thus far for plea bargaining have also been curvilinear. See, 
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 289, 331–32 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook (1983)] (discussing a 
mathematical representation of settlement in the Appendix).  




For example, participants are given a first choice (for exam-
ple, $15 with ninety percent certainty or $10 with 100% cer-
tainty), and depending on what they pick, the certain or uncer-
tain option, the certain outcome either decreases or increases. 
So, if the participant picks $10 with 100% certainty, the next set 
of options may be $9 with 100% certainty or $15 with ninety per-
cent certainty (making the chosen certain option less appealing). 
If the participant picks $15 with ninety percent certainty, the 
next set of options may be $11 with 100% certainty or $15 with 
ninety percent certainty (making the certain option more appeal-
ing). Thus, the certain option’s monetary value (option B in Fig-
ure 2) fluctuates to be more or less appealing with the goal that, 
after enough of these choices, the participant will converge on an 
indifference point. 
The methods for computing indifference points and graph-
ically representing the probability data are the same as in delay 
discounting. The graphed probability indifference points demon-
strate that as the probability of the uncertain option decreases, 
the certain value a participant is willing to accept decreases. For 
example, if offered $155 with 100% certainty or $500 with thirty-
three percent certainty, participants have been shown to prefer 
$155 with 100% certainty,40 but when everything is the same 
except the probability is decreased to ten percent,41 participants 
 
 40. Note that the uncertain option actually leads to a mathematically more 
attractive option, using basic probability: $500 multiplied by thirty-three per-
cent is $165, whereas $155 multiplied by 100% is $155. Thus, the human pref-
erence for the certain option is arguably mathematically irrational. 
 41. Once again, this example compares two indifference points from two 
different decision trees—one from a thirty-three percent decision tree and an-
other from a ten percent decision tree. A common execution of the titration pro-
cedure changes only the certain dollar value and nothing else within each deci-
sion tree. See Du et al., supra note 26, at 484 (discussing an experiment in which 
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are willing to accept as low as $50 with 100% certainty.42 This is 
evidence that participants discount (deem less weighty or im-
portant) the value of the uncertain $500 when probability of re-
ceiving that $500 decreases. 
4. What Questions Does Discounting Answer? 
Discounting tells researchers that when making decisions 
between two choices (1) time between decision and receipt of the 
outcome; and (2) the probability of receipt of the outcome are im-
portant—meaning they influence decisions. To date, the concept 
of discounting has been used to explain decision-making pat-
terns in hypothetical financial gain and loss situations,43 as well 
as real clinical outcomes such as smoking cessation,44 inpatient 
detoxification program retention,45 and various other health be-
haviors.46 However, discounting has not been applied to criminal 
defendant decision-making.  
These studies provide valuable information about human 
behavior. For example, researchers found that current smokers 
devalue rewards delayed further in the future than ex-smokers 
and nonsmokers.47 In other words, the delay until receiving a 
reward is an important feature in predicting people’s smoking 
behavior; a person’s tendency to strongly discount—a pattern of 
strongly devaluing future rewards—predicts poor responses to 
smoking cessation treatments.48 The promise of discounting in 
predicting resistance to smoking cessation treatments suggests 
 
the immediate dollar value decreased while the length of delay and the delayed 
dollar value remained the same).  
 42. See id. at 486–90 (discussing the results of the experiment). 
 43. See Estle et al., supra note 32, at 916 (stating that “different hypothet-
ical amounts of money” were used to test subjects). 
 44. See James MacKillop & Christopher W. Kahler, Delayed Reward Dis-
counting Predicts Treatment Response for Heavy Drinkers Receiving Smoking 
Cessation Treatment, 104 DRUG ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 197 (2009) (using de-
layed reward discounting to study success of smoking cessation). 
 45. Id. at 198 (discussing the relationship between delayed reward dis-
counting (DRD) and substance abuse treatment and stating that studies have 
shown “high levels of DRD are associated with poorer outcomes”). 
 46. James R. Daugherty & Gary L. Brase, Taking Time To Be Healthy: Pre-
dicting Health Behaviors with Delay Discounting and Time Perspective, 48 PER-
SONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 202, 204 (2010) (measuring self-reported 
health behaviors such as tobacco, alcohol, and drug use, exercise frequency, eat-
ing breakfast, and wearing a safety belt). 
 47. MacKillop & Kahler, supra note 44, at 197. This study used a behavioral 
economics index of impulsivity to quantify individuals’ tendency to devalue re-
wards in the future. 
 48. Id. at 202. 
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that discounting may be useful in explaining more than hypo-
thetical, and relatively simple, financial decisions.  
In sum, discounting paradigms help answer two important 
questions: (1) what aspects of a decision between two choices in-
fluence or predict an individual’s final choice; and (2) how do 
those features influence an individual’s final choice? Regarding 
the first question, discounting paradigms suggest that features 
of delay and probability may affect criminal defendants’ choices 
between plea or trial. Importantly, the second question can be 
divided into at least two parts. First, is the relationship positive 
or negative? That is, as a particular feature (for example, proba-
bility of conviction) increases, does the likelihood of plea ac-
ceptance increase or decrease? Second, what is the mathematical 
form of the relationship between the particular feature and the 
likelihood of plea acceptance? For example, is the relationship 
linear or curvilinear?49 
B. PLEA BARGAINING IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  
Legal scholars have relied on substantive law, such as the 
concept of bargaining power in contract law and due process in 
constitutional criminal law, as well as the subfield of law and 
economics, to explain the utility, (un)fairness, and efficiency of 
plea bargaining. This Section provides background information 
on the current state of the legal scholarship on plea bargaining. 
Subsection 1 describes a commonly referenced pair of conflicting 
values: fairness versus efficiency. These values also permeate 
Subsection 2, which explores the substantive legal argument 
that plea bargains are contracts. Subsection 3 summarizes the 
traditional shadow-of-trial model of plea bargaining, and then 
argues that plea-bargaining-as-contract and traditional eco-
nomic conceptions, actor rationality and decision-making, un-
dergird that model. 
 
 49. As discussed in Part I, the traditional law and economics model pro-
poses a simple linear relationship between probability of conviction and plea 
acceptance, whereas discounting literature experimentally demonstrates a hy-
perbolic relationship. See, e.g., Leonard Green & Joel Myerson, Exponential Ver-
sus Hyperbolic Discounting of Delayed Outcomes: Risk and Waiting Time, 36 
AM. ZOOLOGIST 496, 496 (1996) (“Our research demonstrates that, of the two 
[relationships], a hyperbola-like discounting model consistently explains more 
of the variance in temporal discounting data at the group level, and importantly, 
at the individual level as well.”). 
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1. Fairness Versus Efficiency 
Plea bargaining is considered one of “the most controversial 
practices in the criminal justice system,”50 and much of the con-
troversy centers on competing interests and values. In particu-
lar, efficiency is often pitted against fairness.51 Evincing the 
breadth of scholarly opinion, the solutions proposed by scholars 
range between an outright ban on plea bargaining,52 to “prose-
cutorial caution”53 or regulation,54 to alternative dispute resolu-
tions,55 to maintenance of the status quo.56 
Scholars supporting plea bargaining warn of the cost to the 
criminal justice system to adjudicate all—or at least more—
criminal cases, and laud both the usefulness of compromise be-
fore trial and the utility of predictability.57 For example, one 
scholar noted that when prosecutors offer plea bargains “they 
 
 50. Montré D. Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the “Untried Convic-
tion” Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501, 502 (2010).  
 51. Compare Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 
69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 660–61 (1981) (characterizing plea bargaining as inher-
ently unfair and an irrational process), Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining 
As Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 (1992) (concluding that plea bargaining 
should be banned), and Bibas, supra note 16, at 2467–68 (arguing for substan-
tial reforms to plea bargaining), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining 
As Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1972 (1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook 
(1992)] (arguing that plea bargaining and trial processes are equally effective 
at separating the guilty and the innocent), and Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing 
Commissions As Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1010, 1013 (2005) (contending that sentencing commissions can be suc-
cessful in regulating prosecutors’ authority and discretion). 
 52. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2545 (“Short of abolishing plea bargaining en-
tirely, there is no obvious remedy.”). 
 53. Id. at 2536 (discussing limiting prosecutors’ plea discounts as a way to 
“deter prosecutions of the possibly innocent.”); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, A 
Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 
143 (1994) (suggesting the feasibility of a short adversarial bench trial for de-
fendants that choose to have one). 
 54. Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empir-
ical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 77 (2015) (“[W]e must 
be willing to regulate plea bargaining, or the executive branches of the govern-
ment will fill the vacuum with rules favorable to itself.”). 
 55. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 29, 31–32 (2002) (advocating for “prosecutorial ‘screening’ as the 
principal alternative to plea bargains”). 
 56. Easterbrook (1992), supra note 51. 
 57. Jacqueline Cohen & Michael H. Tonry, Sentencing Reforms and Their 
Impacts, in 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 305, 308–
09 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (explaining that criminal attorneys like 
the certainty of the plea). 
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achieve a reliable compromise between maximum punishment 
and no punishment at all.”58  
On the other hand, scholars arguing for the need to ensure 
fairness of process focus primarily on the need for public visibil-
ity,59 as well as defendants’ forfeiture of a number of constitu-
tional rights, including but not limited to the right to a criminal 
trial.60 The so-called waiver bug started in the 1980s and 1990s 
when prosecutors began adding additional terms into plea agree-
ments,61 with the first change of defendants being asked to 
waive their appellate rights.62 Next, waivers of defendants’ right 
to habeas corpus review were added to plea agreements, which 
have been upheld by courts even in the face of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims.63 In the last decade, prosecutors began 
asking defendants to waive their rights to discovery materials, 
which can include evidence of prosecutorial misconduct and even 
exculpatory evidence of the defendant’s actual innocence.64 The 
prevalence rates of these waivers are staggering. Using data 
from robbery and arson cases from the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, over half of plea agreements contained habeas waivers and 
nearly a third of robbery plea agreements permitted the destruc-
tion of DNA evidence, the right to test DNA evidence, or both.65 
 
 58. Wright & Miller, supra note 55, at 38; see also id. at 87 (“A negotiated 
plea is less publicly visible than a trial.”). 
 59. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2545 (“There is precious little oversight of what 
these lawyers do.”); id. at 2547 (“[P]lea bargaining hides within a low-visibility 
process.”). 
 60. Klein et al., supra note 54, at 76 (“[M]any prosecutors began demanding 
waiver of all constitutional criminal procedure rights, not just the trial and in-
vestigative related ones inherent in replacing the trial with the plea.”).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 76. 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(finding a habeas waiver enforceable despite a claim of ineffective counsel). This 
is striking given the fact that the defense attorney is the person the defendant 
is relying on to make the plea deal. Cf. Gabriella Khorasanee, Habeas Waiver 
in Plea Doesn’t Bar Ineffective Counsel Claim, FINDLAW (Aug. 12, 2013), http:// 
blogs.findlaw.com/seventh_circuit/2013/08/habeas-waiver-in-plea-doesnt-bar 
-ineffective-counsel-claim.html. 
 64. Klein et al., supra note 54, at 77. 
 65. See id. at 85 (“27% of robbery plea agreements contained a FOIA 
waiver, 32% contained some combination of Brady waiver (actual innocence or 
Giglio), 29.8% permitted the destruction of DNA evidence, the right to test such 
evidence, or both, and 64% contained habeas waivers. Of the arson plea agree-
ments, 59.2% contained habeas waivers, 23% included FOIA waivers, and 71% 
appeared to contain some combination of Brady waiver (actual innocence or Gi-
glio).”). Note that over half of both samples contained habeas waivers. 
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Despite the seeming dichotomy between efficiency interests 
and fairness values, efficiency and fairness are not mutually ex-
clusive,66 nor are these two characteristics either wholly present 
or absent—making the plea bargaining process either efficient 
or inefficient, fair or unfair.67 Rather, it is a matter of degree. 
Despite the clashing of scholarly opinion and some voices calling 
for reform for more than thirty years,68 plea bargaining has con-
tinued without any substantive modification.69  
2. Plea-Bargain-as-Contract 
In plea bargaining scholarship, plea-bargain-as-contract is 
a foundational term of art that equates, or at least analogizes, 
plea bargains to contracts, and many scholars examine plea bar-
gains through the lens of traditional contract law.70 Efficiency 
and fairness interests undergird many contract law explanations 
of plea bargaining.71 For example, an efficient system of con-
tracting can “reduce the harm to innocent defendants and mean-
while reduce transaction costs and inefficiency for everyone 
 
 66. WILKINSON & KLAES, supra note 23, at 396 (“[T]his book . . . takes the 
view that ‘fairness is in the eye of the beholder.’”). 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 428 (“[I]n an ultimatum game, offering 80%/20% may be 
regarded as unfair in some situations, but fair in others, depending on what 
alternatives were open to the decision-maker.”). Situational dependency of fair-
ness and efficiency is not the only source of nuance. Efficiency and fairness are 
often treated as continuous variables, rather than binary ones. See, for example, 
CINZIA DARAIO & LÉOPOLD SIMAR, ADVANCED ROBUST AND NONPARAMETRIC 
METHODS IN EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATIONS 13–15 
(2007) (describing the calculation of efficiency as a ratio). 
 68. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 51 (arguing to abolish plea bargaining). 
 69. See Klein et al., supra note 54, at 74–75 (discussing what the current 
plea bargaining process looks like, which began to shift to its current form in 
the 1970s). 
 70. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992); cf. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Bargaining Power in 
the Shadow of the Law: Commentary to Professors Wright & Engen, Professor 
Birke, and Josh Bowers, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 123–24 (2007) (“[F]rom a con-
tract law standpoint, it is difficult to think of plea bargains as ‘contracts’ in any 
sense . . . . Such agreements are, in fact, merely one more point on a continuum 
of bargaining, promissory, and contractual relationships based upon the rela-
tive bargaining power of the parties.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 70, at 128 (“Producers in such situations 
likewise may have incentives to impose inefficient standard form terms upon 
consumers, knowing that consumers are unlikely to have sufficient information 
or bargaining power to identify or negotiate away from such terms.”). 
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else,”72 which maximizes the system’s overall utility.73 This ex-
ample also demonstrates how fairness interests, vis-à-vis re-
duced harm to innocents,74 can overlap with efficiency interests. 
Contract law also grapples with issues of coercion, fraud, and 
distributive justice, which affect both system fairness and effi-
ciency.75 It is important to recognize that the substance of con-
tract law addresses both efficiency and fairness arguments, be-
cause contract law may be fertile ground for scholars with 
different philosophical beliefs to achieve a meeting of the minds 
about plea bargaining. However, for this to be possible, the field 
needs to first grapple with whether a plea agreement can accu-
rately be characterized as a contract. 
The concept of plea-bargaining-as-contract relies on the 
premise that parties have the relatively unconditioned right to 
strike a bargain,76 and on its face, a plea agreement is bargained 
for between the prosecutor and defense attorney. However, one 
must at least wonder, given the widespread and systematic dis-
enfranchisement evinced by the growing waiver of rights 
through plea bargains, whether a plea bargain agreement can 
accurately be called a contract made freely between two parties. 
It may be that the freedom to contract, even with constitutional 
entitlements, is cognizable under traditional contract law be-
cause the freedom to contract is the overriding presumption.77 
Arguably, the very nature of an entitlement means that individ-
uals can exploit and bargain them away for value.78 Addition-
ally, Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz argue that without 
the freedom for criminal defendants to bargain with their enti-
tlement to trial, it would instead become a burden on defend-
ants—a burden of lost money, lost time, and lost opportunity for 
 
 72. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 70, at 1967. 
 73. See id. (“By following appropriate contract models, one can devise dif-
ferent rules that reduce the harm to innocent defendants and meanwhile reduce 
transaction costs and inefficiency for everyone else.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1913 (“Force, fraud, and even distributional unfairness are all 
grounds for restricting contract. If they are pervasive in the plea bargaining 
process, then plea bargaining should be abolished—not as a matter of constitu-
tional law, but as a matter of contract law and contract principles.”). 
 76. Easterbrook (1992), supra note 51, at 1978. 
 77. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 70, at 1912, 1931 (“The potential unfair-
ness in the typical plea bargain is not that the defendant gives up some legal 
entitlements, but that he may not get enough from the government in return.”). 
 78. Id. at 1915. 
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a reduced sentence.79 In sum, there are strong arguments for al-
lowing criminal defendants to bargain away their constitutional 
rights. 
On the other hand, do plea bargains preserve the key fea-
tures of a contractual choice: “free, informed, and rational?”80 
Without those key features, a system of bargaining with consti-
tutional entitlements may be condoning disenfranchisement.81 
The freedom of choice is closely linked to the presence or absence 
of disparate bargaining power.82 For example, in traditional con-
tract law, if a seller has a monopoly on the market, then individ-
ual buyers do not have a free choice to bargain for all features of 
the contract;83 simplistically a buyer’s choice starts with the pos-
sibility of negotiating with multiple sellers regarding their re-
spective requests and becomes restricted to a binary choice to 
either obtain the product on the monopolist’s terms, or forgo the 
benefit that the product or service confers. Thus a monopoly con-
strains the buyer’s freedom in an important way. Accordingly, 
courts have protected parties from particular classes of contracts 
where standard forms and market power combine to systemati-
cally disadvantage one party84—and plea bargains may fit this 
bill. 
Analogizing from seller/buyer in traditional contracting to 
government/defendant in plea bargaining, the characterization 
 
 79. Id. at 1913. 
 80. Id. at 1918. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Barnhizer, supra note 70, at 124 (“The problem with criminal plea ne-
gotiations isn’t really that the resulting agreements aren’t contracts. It is that 
the power relationship between the parties appears so one-sided that even in-
nocent parties may have strong incentives to accept a guilty plea rather than 
face trial—their best, worst, and only alternative to a negotiated agreement.”). 
 83. See Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1990) 
(applying traditional contract law to a monopoly situation). 
 84. See id. at 87 (reasoning that the standardized form of a warranty, which 
now protects the car maker more than the ordinary customer, combined with a 
monopoly on the car market and unequal bargaining powers is enough to deem 
the contract unfairly procured). In Richards v. Richards, the court concluded 
that a contract was void for policy reasons, including that the standardized 
agreement leaves no room for negotiation—which was particularly problematic 
given the breadth of the release. 513 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Wis. 1994).  
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of plea bargain documents as having boilerplate waivers of vari-
ous sorts85 suggests the presence of a standard form. Addition-
ally, “standard-form plea agreements,”86 in which a guilty plea 
is “accompanied by standardized charge reduction[ ] . . . [,] ren-
ders negotiation more of a theoretical possibility than the 
norm.”87 Moreover, in large numbers of misdemeanors or low-
level felonies, plea bargains often are the product of “an assem-
bly line model of case processing,”88 with prosecutors relying 
largely on police reports and assigning a preliminary offer—
which is often the final offer.89 This prosecutorial power and lack 
of true back-and-forth bargaining has caused scholars to com-
ment on the “coercive aspects of the structure of the negotiation 
itself.”90 Furthermore, in criminal law, the government’s prose-
cutors have a monopoly on plea bargains.91 Defense attorneys 
and criminal defendants cannot shop around for a sympathetic 
 
 85. See Klein et al., supra note 54, at 85; see also John G. Douglass, Fatal 
Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 
437, 510 (2001) (noting that prosecutors in both the Northern and Southern 
Districts of California put “Brady waiver[s]” in their standard form plea bar-
gains after Sanchez v. United States, a Ninth Circuit decision that adopted the 
post-plea standard of materiality to determine whether a defendant may with-
draw a guilty plea); Benjamin A. Naftalis, “Queen for A Day” Agreements and 
the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 3 n.6 (2003) (citing United States v. Mezzanatto, 
513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)) (“Already, standard forms in-
dicate that many federal prosecutors routinely require waiver of Rules 410 and 
11(e)(6) rights before a prosecutor is willing to enter into plea discussions.”).  
 86. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Mar-
ket: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1160 
(2011) (suggesting that supervision attorneys could oversee fairness of process). 
 87. Priyanka Prakash, Comment, To Plea or Not To Plea: The Benefits of 
Establishing an Institutionalized Plea Bargaining System in Japan, 20 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 607, 633 n.22 (2011). 
 88. Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bar-
gaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 311 (2007). 
 89. Prakash, supra note 87, at 311–12; see also Richard B. Zabel & James 
J. Benjamin, Jr., “Queen for A Day” or “Courtesan for A Day”: The Sixth Amend-
ment Limits to Proffer Agreements, 15 No. 9 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 1, 5 
(Oct. 2001), https://www.akingump.com/images/content/9/6/v4/961/306.pdf 
(“Prosecutors generally refuse to forego or tinker with the language of proffer 
agreements. Thus, a defendant who chooses not to sign the proffer agreement 
in effect chooses not to proffer.”). 
 90. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence: Waiver 
-Plea Negotiation Statements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 249, 253–54 (1995) (“The cru-
cial issue is . . . the actions of the government in presenting certain choices to a 
criminal defendant in the first place.”). 
 91. Easterbrook (1983), supra note 39, at 311 (“The prosecutor may impose 
the penalty because of the bilateral monopoly that accompanies plea bargain-
ing: the defendant cannot insist on dealing with another prosecutor.”). 
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prosecutor or jurisdiction.92 Thus, the proliferation of waivers 
that substantially expand the breadth of rights signed over by 
the defendant, the use of standard form plea bargains, and pros-
ecutors’ monopoly power undermine both the integrity of a free 
contractual choice and the fairness of the plea bargain contract.  
In sum, balancing efficiency and fairness is a recurring 
theme in foundational legal scholarship on plea bargaining that 
overlaps with traditional contract policy arguments. Efficiency 
arguments are built into plea-bargaining-as-contract via defend-
ants’ freedom to contract and maximize their constitutional en-
titlements in order to receive a charge-sentence discount.93 Fair-
ness arguments appear in the form of various concerns about the 
effects of disparate bargaining power.94 Furthermore, the fair-
ness arguments only become more potent when analogizing from 
buyer-seller situations to the criminal justice system, where 
physical freedom and other fundamental rights are at stake.95 
3. The Shadow-of-Trial Model 
The shadow-of-trial model describes plea bargaining as con-
tracting in the shadow of expected trial outcomes, including the 
 
 92. Naftalis, supra note 85, at 41 (“[P]arties to this bilateral monopoly pos-
sess significantly disparate bargaining power positions.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Easterbrook (1983), supra note 39, at 297 (“Settlement is a 
form of contract. A deal is possible if the defendant’s maximum offer equals or 
exceeds the prosecutor ’s minimum demand. The defendant saves the anxiety 
and cost of litigation, and the prosecutor frees up resources to pursue other 
criminals.”). 
 94. See Barnhizer, supra note 70, at 124 (“[T]he question of whether a 
promise or agreement should be enforceable under contract law depends en-
tirely upon whether both parties to the transaction possessed bargaining power 
of a type that courts can consistently and credibly identify.”). 
 95. This is partly because freedom to buy a particular product is qualita-
tively different from loss of physical freedom. Additionally, however, unlike civil 
contracts, contracting with constitutional entitlements during the criminal jus-
tice process is different and, per the Supreme Court, is a protected area of crim-
inal process. See Stephanie Stern, Note, Regulating the New Gold Standard of 
Criminal Justice: Confronting the Lack of Record-Keeping in the American 
Criminal Justice System, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 245, 245–46 (2015) (citing Lafler 
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012)); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 
(2012)); see also Brown v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 229 Cal. App. 4th 320, 323 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2014) (“Since plea bargains are enforced by courts on due process 
grounds, principles of contract law should not be imported wholesale into the 
plea bargaining process.”). A last important difference is that contract law is 
governed by state law, whereas plea bargaining seems to be governed by state 
contract law—for example, see Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“California courts are required to construe and interpret plea agreements 
in accordance with state contract law.”)—as well as the Due Process Clause. 
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specific potential conviction and its respective sentence.96 First 
described in a seminal article on divorce settlement,97 scholars 
have since used this model98 to defend plea bargaining, arguing 
that these contracts reflect the sentence outcomes that would 
have occurred at trial minus a fixed discount.99 The shadow-of-
trial model has been used to argue for maintaining the plea bar-
gaining system as is, because sentences are assumed to mirror 
culpability, incentivize prosecutors from convicting innocents, 
and deter police misconduct.100 
Overall, proponents of the model use it to justify the plea 
bargaining system by emphasizing the intuitive contracts-and 
efficiency-based bargain: exchanging a charge-sentence discount 
for reduced demands on the criminal justice system’s re-
sources.101 However, the shadow-of-trial model assumes that 
fairness concerns function at the margins and accordingly are 
not sufficient to undermine the benefit of the system’s effi-
ciency.102 Although envisioning negotiations in the dark shadow 
of a looming trial is a salient metaphor, the shadow-of-trial 
model reduces the complex constellation of contractual efficiency 
and fairness arguments discussed above to a “rational choice 
among independent economic actors.”103 The rationality of the 
choice is used to justify individual plea bargain outcomes as well 
as the very plea bargaining system itself. But what does ration-
ality mean when defendants are bargaining against a monopoly 
with a standard form as a baseline contract? The shadow-of-trial 
model not only fails to provide an answer, but conclusively dis-
misses the disparate bargaining power considerations to the 
 
 96. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465; Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining 
is a Shadow Market, 51 DUQUESNE L. REV. 551, 551 (2013) [hereinafter Easter-
brook (2013)] (“Plea bargaining is a form of contract, and its regulation through 
the common-law process is fundamentally no different from the way courts treat 
other contracts. People bargain to advance their view of their interests.”). 
 97. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). 
 98. For scholarship on the shadow-of-trial model, see Easterbrook (1983), 
supra note 39; Easterbrook (1992), supra note 51; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 
70. 
 99. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465; Easterbrook (1983), supra note 39, at 
308–09. 
 100. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2466. 
 101. Easterbrook (2013), supra note 96, at 552.  
 102. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465–66. 
 103. Jennifer Rae Taylor, Restoring the Bargain: Examining Post-Plea Sen-
tence Enhancement As an Unconscionable Violation of Contract Law, 48 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 129, 142 (2011). 
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margins because, the theory goes, criminal defendants will make 
a rational choice.104 
The shadow-of-trial model is a specific application of effi-
ciency-based contract arguments that treat actor rationality as 
a panacea to any and all fairness concerns, but in the last decade 
the model has been questioned.105 The next Section outlines the 
initial efforts of scholars to evaluate the shadow-of-trial model. 
Most of the model’s critics invoke nontraditional economic mod-
els of human rationality by borrowing from disciplines like cog-
nitive psychology.106 
C. THE BEGINNINGS OF A BRIDGE BETWEEN DISCOUNTING AND 
PLEA BARGAINING 
Despite the lack of experimental discounting studies that 
explain plea bargain decision-making, scholars have taken foun-
dational first steps toward the mutually beneficial unification of 
discounting and plea bargaining. Scholars from different disci-
plines have begun to question the traditional law and economics 
model by pointing to cognitive principles.107 This Section de-
scribes and connects the theoretical and experimental begin-
nings of disciplinary cross-talk regarding plea bargaining deci-
sion-making, most recently initiated by Stephanos Bibas. 
Subsection 1 delineates Bibas’s influential critique of the 
shadow-of-trial model and the scholarly work he evoked in the 
academic legal community. Subsection 2 details the experi-
mental and empirical studies that test legal experts’ theories 
about what drives plea bargain decisions. Both Subsections also 
point out what theoretical and experimental advancement still 
 
 104. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2464. 
 105. Id. at 2467. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.; Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 205, 208; Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, 
and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 185 (2007) [hereinafter Burke 
(2007)]; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, 
and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 165 (2007). The reasons for the 
emergence of this discourse is outside the scope of this Note, but may be due to 
the cross-disciplinary impact of psychologists like Kahneman and Tversky, who 
had a strong influence on behavioral economics, as well as the public via acces-
sible books. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (Farrar et al. eds., 
2011); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT: A FRIENDSHIP THAT CHANGED 
OUR MINDS (2017); see also Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 24 (explaining 
the impact of cognitive psychology on behavioral economics); Kahneman, supra 
note 20 (using psychology to inform behavioral economics).  
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needs to be done to prepare for the more developed critique in 
Part II and the proposed solution in Part III. 
1. Bibas Questions the Simplicity of the Shadow-of-Trial 
Model 
In 2004, Stephanos Bibas argued that the shadow-of-trial 
model needs to more strongly weigh variables like transaction 
costs, time, financial access, and risk preferences,108 as opposed 
to the traditional overemphasis on trial charge-sentence dis-
counts.109 As mentioned above,110 many of the shadow-of-trial 
supporters are also supporters of traditional economic models, 
which assume that variables like transaction costs and individ-
ual decision-making differences are negligible.111 For example, 
noted jurist and law-and-economics scholar Judge Frank Easter-
brook has espoused exactly this view, writing, “First, like all eco-
nomic analysis, [my argument] proceeds on the assumption that 
large groups of people act as if each person is a rational maxi-
mizer.”112 Additionally, in a journal article he authored, Judge 
Easterbrook once provided a formula that he suggested might 
describe and predict trends in plea acceptance: the defendant’s 
best offer, “Vd, is given by Vd = pdJ + Cd, where J is the punish-
ment expected if there is a trial and conviction, pd is the defend-
ant’s subjective estimate of the probability of conviction, and Cd 
is the amount by which the defendant’s costs of going to trial 
exceed his costs of settling.”113 Although he acknowledges the 
complexity of both delay until trial and how cost of trial may in-
fluence a person’s perception of probability of conviction, he “dis-
regard[s]” them by not including these factors in his models.114 
Theoretical formulas, unsupported by experimental or empirical 
data, are common in the law and economics field, but it stands 
 
 108. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465 n.3 (noting that these variables are rele-
gated by Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser to a single sentence in their 
conclusion). 
 109. Id. at 2465. 
 110. Supra Part I.B.3. 
 111. See, e.g., Edward A. Ruttenburg, Plea Bargaining Analytically: The 
Nash Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 353 (1979). 
 112. Easterbrook (1983), supra note 39, at 291. 
 113. Id. at 331.  
 114. Id. (“Because the present value of J is influenced substantially by delay 
in the commencement of sentence, a complete model would reflect the time 
value of the punishment. That is not necessary for present purposes, however. 
Similarly, I disregard the effect Cd may have on pd.”). 
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to benefit from using more realistic, and empirically-defensible, 
methods of analysis.115 
Behavioral economics may offer the solution. Bibas’s encour-
agement to not rely on hypothetical models is theoretically and 
conceptually consistent with the goals of behavioral econom-
ics.116 In fact, Bibas explicitly connects his argument to behav-
ioral law and economics literature by challenging the shadow-of-
trial model’s “assumption that actors are perfectly rational,”117 
which is one of behavioral economics’ central criticisms of tradi-
tional economics: “behavioral models . . . can even be more pre-
cise than traditional ones which assume more [actor] rational-
ity.”118 Thus, a bridge between behavioral economics and plea 
bargaining has a theoretical foundation, which Bibas brought to 
the fore. 
Moreover, legal scholars have even identified the concepts of 
delay to trial and probability of conviction, which suggests a con-
nection to delay and probability discounting research.119 For ex-
ample, Judge Easterbrook has noted the importance of probabil-
ity of conviction to the bargaining model,120 and Bibas and other 
scholars have taken note of what they call “time discounting.”121 
However, to date, there are important features missing from the 
 
 115. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less 
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 
677 (1994) (using formulas as “formal proof,” rather than experimental data). 
 116. See discussion supra note 22; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 24, 
at 1–2 (describing the aims of behavioral economics). 
 117. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2496 (“A more basic problem with the reigning 
model is its assumption that actors are perfectly rational. The behavioral law 
and economics literature has undermined this assumption, exposing consistent 
irrationalities and imperfect heuristics in human decisionmaking. Until now, 
however, the literature has largely ignored how these deficiencies skew plea 
bargaining.”). 
 118. Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 24, at 3. 
 119. See supra Part I.A. 
 120. Easterbrook (1983), supra note 39, at 331–32 (including probability of 
conviction in his hypothetical model); Easterbrook (2013), supra note 96, at 552 
(“Defendants are risk averse and prefer the certainty of a year in prison to a 
50/50 or 90/10 chance of a longer term.”). 
 121. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465; Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Rela-
tionship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 
213, 221 (2007) [hereinafter Covey (2007)] (“[I]t is always marginally better to 
consume a good now (or defer a bad until later) than to defer gratification until 
tomorrow (or suffer the bad consequence now), for the simple reason that tomor-
row may never come. However, while some discounting is rational, significant 
discounting may not be.”); see also Easterbrook (1983), supra note 39, at 294–
95. 
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scholarship: (1) no scholar has explicitly used the behavioral eco-
nomics concept of discounting; and (2) no scholar has connected 
the two concepts to explain a systematic cognitive psychological 
trend.122 The scholars that come so close to substantively con-
necting probability and delay discounting to plea bargaining fo-
cus instead on hypothetical models of human behavior.123 They 
also assume that “criminals as a class” are probably different 
from the rest of the population because they are more impulsive 
or likely to take risks.124  
The key benefit of applying discounting to plea bargaining 
is not merely to enable scholars to discuss risk aversion and risk-
taking propensities of subclasses of the population, but rather to 
bring to light a robust human cognitive preference for immediate 
and certain outcomes. Importantly, this preference might ex-
plain why the vast majority of criminal defendants accept plea 
bargains—because the majority of all people would take a deal 
under the same circumstances. 
2. Experimental Tests of the Shadow-of-Trial Model 
Although plea bargaining studies in social science are 
emerging,125 this Note (and Subsection particularly) focuses on 
studies that evaluate a general model of decision-making by 
pointing to particular features that theoretically affect final de-
cisions to plead guilty or go to trial. To date, there are only a 
handful of studies that fit this bill. In walking through the de-
tails of the studies, this Subsection proceeds in chronological or-
der based on publication date and notes the limitations of each 
study. 
 
 122. Chad M. Oldfather, Heuristics, Biases, and Criminal Defendants, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 249, 249 (2007) (“As most of the commentators who have applied 
behavioral law and economics to the plea bargaining process have pointed out, 
what results appears to present something of a puzzle. A straightforward appli-
cation of the heuristics and biases literature leads to the conclusion that plea 
bargaining should occur only rarely.”). 
 123. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 124. Covey (2007), supra note 121, at 220. 
 125. See generally Besiki L. Kutateladze et al., Does Evidence Really Matter? 
An Exploratory Analysis of the Role of Evidence in Plea Bargaining in Felony 
Drug Cases, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431 (2015) (evaluating the influence of ev-
idence on plea bargaining in felony drug cases); Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal De-
cisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, 
Pleas, Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 LAW & HUM. BE-
HAV. 253 (2005) (examining plea bargaining in the juvenile context). 
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In 1986, Hunter A. McAllister and Norman J. Bregman con-
ducted an experimental study of defendants’ and defense attor-
neys’ plea bargain decisions based on post-conviction sentence 
severity and the probability of conviction.126 Using a sample of 
twenty-four individuals, the researchers gave each participant a 
packet containing six hypothetical cases in which the participant 
was instructed to imagine themselves as the criminal defendant 
and decide between a plea bargained sentence of one year in 
prison versus trial with probability of conviction (for example, 
eighty percent, fifty percent, or twenty percent) and sentence (for 
example, two or five years).127 McAllister and Bregman found 
that (1) as the severity of the post-conviction sentence increased 
(two years to five years), the proportion of individuals that ac-
cepted the plea increased; and (2) as the probability of conviction 
increased (from twenty percent to fifty percent probability of con-
viction at trial), the proportion of individuals that accepted the 
plea increased.128 Accordingly, this study points to sentence dis-
counting and probability of conviction as important factors af-
fecting people placed in criminal defendants’ shoes by reading a 
hypothetical scenario.  
McAllister and Bregman’s study is the only study that spe-
cifically asks participants to make plea bargain decisions, acting 
as a criminal defendant. Notably, the sample size is small and 
the sentences tested are not particularly realistic, because they 
do not vary in charge (misdemeanor versus felony) and only en-
tail jail time of a relatively restricted length of time, a differen-
tial of three years. Moreover, jail sentences are usually accom-
panied by other sentence elements such as probation.129 
Additionally, delay to trial is notably missing as a variable of 
interest. In sum, McAllister and Bregman found evidence con-
sistent with the shadow-of-trial model, which emphasizes the 
importance of sentence discounting, and they found evidence 
 
 126. Hunter A. McAllister & Norman J. Bregman, Plea Bargaining by De-
fendants: A Decision Theory Approach, 126 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 106–08 (1986) 
[hereinafter McAllister & Bregman (Defendants)]. 
 127. Id. at 106–07. 
 128. Id. at 108. 
 129. See, e.g., John D. Burrow & Patrick G. Lowery, A Preliminary Assess-
ment of the Impact of Plea Bargaining Among a Sample of Waiver-Eligible Of-
fenders, 13 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 211, 222–23 (2015) (explaining that 
sentences may include sex offender registration or placement in a treatment 
program); Rebecca K. Helm & Valerie F. Reyna, Logical but Incompetent 
Plea Decisions: A New Approach to Plea Bargaining Grounded in Cognitive The-
ory, 23 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 367, 376 (2017) (using length of probation 
time to alter severity of sentences). 
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consistent with probability of conviction, which is less empha-
sized but still included in the shadow-of-trial model.130  
These researchers, though, did not explicitly set out to 
(dis)prove the shadow-of-trial model. Their stated purpose “was 
to examine the extent to which defendants are rational decision 
makers,”131 which they define as decision-making that “at-
tempt[s] to minimize his sentence,”132 which is conceptually tied 
to the shadow-of-trial model.133 
More recently, in 2012, Shawn D. Bushway and Allison D. 
Redlich, responding to Bibas, introduced the concept of shadow-
of-trial model to “a criminological audience”134 and used archival 
trial and plea bargain data135 from the 1970s to “test whether 
the presence or absence of certain kinds of evidence drives plea 
discounts.”136 They reasoned that certain kinds of evidence such 
as confessions should theoretically increase the probability of 
conviction and thus increase plea acceptance.137 Their sample 
consisted of 1593 plea cases and 305 tried cases of robbery and 
burglary cases with male defendants; they coded the type of evi-
dence in the case (eyewitness, confession, physical evidence, et 
cetera) as well as other demographic information (age, race, 
number of prior felony arrests, and drug history).138 In general, 
their model, which predicted that evidence increased the proba-
bility of conviction at trial and in turn increased likelihood of 
plea acceptance, did not hold up; “[o]ur prediction was that evi-
dence would be positively correlated with the probability of con-
viction. However, . . . the evidence is either not significant or it 
is negative and significant.”139 
 
 130. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence 
Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 82 (2009) (explaining the shadow-of-trial 
model) [hereinafter Covey (2009)].  
 131. McAllister & Bregman (Defendants), supra note 126, at 106. 
 132. Id. at 105. 
 133. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 134. Bushway & Redlich, supra note 15, at 438. 
 135. Id. at 440 (“We will test this simple model with a well-known plea-bar-
gaining dataset, Plea Bargaining in the United States, 1978 by Miller et al. 
(1980).”). 
 136. Id. at 443 (“[I]f prosecuting and defense attorneys are basing their plea 
offers/acceptances on what jurors would do at trial, rather than structural or 
extra-legal factors (such as race of the defendant), we would expect to see the 
presence of confession, for example, to influence the plea discount.”). 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 445. 
 139. Id. at 449 (“Our prediction was that evidence would be positively corre-
lated with the probability of conviction. However, in Column 1, of Table 5, the 
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 A basic premise of the shadow-of-trial model is that 
strength of a case incentivizes rational decisions to accept a 
guilty plea.140 An intuitive way to measure strength of a criminal 
case is strength of the evidence against the criminal defendant, 
and yet, using real criminal cases, the researchers did not find a 
link. In explaining their results, Bushway and Redlich cursorily 
point to Bibas’s suggestion that there may be significant individ-
ual differences in perceptions of the pleas associated sentence 
discounting, which in turn problematizes the simple rationality 
analysis suggesting that increased amounts of evidence would 
increase the probability of conviction at trial.141 Thus, the 2012 
study by Bushway and Redlich, relying on archival data from the 
1970s, did not find evidence supporting the shadow-of-trial 
model’s assumption that evidence strength determines the prob-
ability of conviction. 
After the disappointment with archival data, Bushway, Red-
lich, and Robert J. Norris performed original data collection142 
so that they could control what questions were asked rather than 
rely on data collected decades previously.143 Specifically, the re-
searchers assessed 1585 judges’ and attorneys’ perceptions of 
probability of conviction based on type of evidence present (DNA, 
eyewitness, and confession) and a long or short defendant crim-
inal history.144 They found “that the basic shadow of the trial 
theory seems to hold across the experimental manipulations.”145 
 
evidence is either not significant or it is negative and significant. The effects are 
large, with a confession leading to a nearly 12 percentage point reduction in the 
probability of conviction at trial for those who pled guilty. The R2 are also quite 
low (.045). In general, the model performs poorly.”). 
 140. Covey (2009), supra note 130, at 81 (“To the extent that evidence tends 
to be strongest against defendants who are ‘actually guilty,’ and weakest 
against defendants who are innocent, the pricing model seems consistent with 
conventional conceptions of justice.”). 
 141. Bushway & Redlich, supra note 15, at 450–51. (“Bibas (2004) argues 
convincingly that the evaluation of the shadow-of-trial model must take place 
at the individual level. He posited that the plea discount would be both too high 
and too low for some people relative to what one would expect if bargaining 
occurred in the shadow of the trial. He also argued that this variation would not 
be explained by factors such as evidence. His claims appear to be true in these 
data.”). 
 142. Bushway et al., supra note 15, at 725.  
 143. Constance Jones, Archival Data: Advantages and Disadvantages for Re-
search in Psychology, 4 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1008, 1013 
(2010) (“[A]n identified data set genuinely [may] not contain information needed 
to address the researcher ’s research question, despite whatever efforts have 
been put into understanding the data set.”). 
 144. Bushway et al., supra note 15, at 734. 
 145. Id. at 741. 
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Notably, however, this experimental work left out the delay until 
trial as well as criminal defendant decision-making. 
In a 2011 study using archival data from Cook County, Illi-
nois, David Abrams found that, on average, the plea sentence 
accepted by criminal defendants was higher than the sentences 
that criminal defendants received at trial.146 Specifically, after 
controlling for case and defendant characteristics,147 sentence 
lengths were longer for defendants that accepted a plea bargain 
than those that went to trial—suggesting exactly the opposite of 
the shadow-of-trial model: defendants may not be getting sen-
tence discounts when compared to defendants that went to 
trial.148  
Responding to Abrams’s results, Bushway, Redlich, and 
Norris summarized three possible explanations: “[D]efendants 
1) are acting irrationally (they should be going to trial), 2) are 
risk adverse, or 3) are facing significant nonsentencing costs for 
going to trial.”149 Arguably, based on the traditional focus on 
charge-sentence discounting, defendants in this sample are act-
ing irrationally. This suggests either that the criminal defend-
ants in the sample are different from the rest of the population 
in their ability to reason or the variables being used to define 
human rationality are limited and overly simplistic. 
In sum, as a general body of work, only one experiment as-
sessed criminal defendant decision-making;150 the archival work 
using real criminal defendants found no support for the shadow-
of-trial model;151 and experimental work using attorneys and 
judges found evidence for the shadow-of-trial model.152 Thus alt-
hough there has been some empirical and experimental work ex-
ploring models of plea bargain decision-making, the results re-
garding real-world validity of the shadow-of-trial model are 
 
 146. David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 200, 201 (2011). 
 147. Id. at 208 (including number of charges, defendant race, defendant sex, 
defendant age, finding of guilt, offense type, and presence of a weapon). 
 148. Id. at 213–14. As seen in Table 3, crime severity as measured by num-
ber of charges explained less than one percent of the variance in sentence 
length, and crime severity as measured by the “violent” category explained less 
than or equal to 0.5% of the variance of sentence length, as evidenced by three 
crime type categories being entered into the model simultaneously and produc-
ing an adjusted R2 of .047 compared to the just plea model in column 1 which 
produced an adjusted R2 of .024. 
 149. Bushway et al., supra note 15, at 730. 
 150. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 151. Abrams, supra note 146; Bushway & Redlich, supra note 15, at 449. 
 152. Bushway et al., supra note 15, at 740. 
 954 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:923 
 
mixed and possibly depend on the type of sample used. The next 
Part addresses the obstacles that legal scholars and researchers 
may be facing in their attempts to test the shadow-of-trial model. 
II.  OBSTACLES TO BRIDGE-BUILDING   
Although there have been important initial steps toward un-
derstanding factors influencing criminal defendant plea bargain 
decisions, there are also obstacles to the conceptual unification 
of legal and experimental scholarship. First, legal (and law and 
economics) scholars’ comfort with, and use of, argument by anal-
ogy perpetuates the continued use of—and reliance on—un-
tested hypotheses. Second, there is valid concern regarding the 
descriptive utility of social science data; even if scholars do the 
work of assessing the impact of cognitive biases, how useful will 
they be in describing real world rates and patterns of plea bar-
gain decisions? Third, empirical and experimental work has ar-
guably lost sight of the central decision-maker, the criminal de-
fendant, and overlooked the promise of behavioral economics.  
A. LEGAL SCHOLARS’ UNTESTED HYPOTHESES AND REASONING 
BY ANALOGY 
Bibas criticizes the shadow-of-trial model for oversimplify-
ing plea bargain decision-making and treating psychological bi-
ases as if they influence decisions only “at the margins.”153 To 
rectify this, he expressly applies cognitive psychology concepts 
to the plea bargaining context and argues that psychological 
findings could be pervasive.154 He argues this by using evidence 
from psychology studies to analogize to the plea bargaining con-
text. For example, he writes: 
Hundreds of psychological studies, however, show that people are con-
sistently too optimistic and therefore overconfident in their chances of 
achieving favorable outcomes . . . . Overconfidence leads each side to 
more extreme aspirations and reservation prices in negotiations, re-
ducing the incentive to compromise . . . . Because [overconfidence] 
makes the trial out-come seem more promising, defendants will lean 
toward rejecting these sentence bargains.155 
 
 153. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465–67. 
 154. Id. at 2527. Bibas describes a number of cognitive psychology findings 
that have different effects on behavior: (1) psychological processes that “lead 
parties to resist or even reject beneficial bargains”; (2) processes that “prevent 
the parties from seeing the weaknesses in their own cases”; and (3) processes 
that “lead defendants to reject lighter plea bargains in the present and to accept 
worse sentences in the future.” Id. at 2496. 
 155. Id. at 2498–2500. 
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Others have been inspired by Bibas and they, also by anal-
ogy, have applied cognitive psychology concepts to actors in plea 
bargaining contexts.156 They too do not collect original data, but 
rather argue for an expansion of shadow-of-trial model through 
powerful anecdotes and untested hypotheses.157 For example, 
Alafair Burke describes four types of cognitive bias (confirmation 
bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance, and 
avoidance of cognitive dissonance) and then explains how they 
could be at work in prosecutorial decision-making in plea bar-
gain situations158 like decisions to investigate and charge: “[t]he 
phenomenon of confirmation bias suggests a natural tendency to 
review the reports not for exculpatory evidence that might dis-
confirm the tested hypothesis, but instead for inculpatory, con-
firming evidence.”159 
Because Bibas does not provide an empirical or experi-
mental test of this argument, he rightly characterizes his work 
as observation, and he calls for research to assess plea bargain-
ing from a psychological lens.160 To jumpstart research, Bibas 
 
 156. See Russell Covey, Behavioral Economics and Plea Bargaining, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 643 (Eyal Zamir 
& Doran Teichman eds., 2014) [hereinafter Covey (2014)]; Alafair S. Burke, Im-
proving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006) [hereinafter Burke (2006)]; William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2548 (2004); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in 
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005); Birke, supra note 107; 
Burke (2007), supra note 107; Holander-Blumoff, supra note 107. 
 157. The following articles simply describe past social science empirical find-
ings and argue that they have implications for plea bargaining: Covey (2014), 
supra note 156; Burke (2006), supra note 156; Burke (2007), supra note 107; 
Covey (2007), supra note 121; Holander-Blumoff, supra note 107. 
 158. Burke (2006), supra note 156, at 1602–06 (“No reason exists to believe 
that lawyers are immune from the documented bounds of rationality, and yet 
the literature on prosecutorial decision making continues to describe prosecu-
tors as rational, wealth-maximizing actors . . . . Through the lens of the cogni-
tive phenomena summarized in Part I, a more complicated story is evident . . . . 
This Part explores some of the potential ways that cognitive bias may taint the 
decision making of even ethical prosecutors when executing this broad discre-
tion.”). 
 159. Id. at 1603. 
 160. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2530 (“The size of each variable may be uncer-
tain, but that is not a good reason to set each variable at zero. Rather, this dif-
ficulty should spur empirical research to measure these [demographic] factors. 
Though there are many empirical studies on negotiating civil settlements, very 
few exist on the criminal side.”); id. at 2547 (“[Researchers] can use databases 
to compare charges and sentences, can interview lawyers and defendants, and 
can test hypothetical scenarios on these parties.”). Interestingly, Bibas does not 
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hypothesizes that psychological factors push defendants to 
choose the trial option even when it may be harmful to them.161 
If Bibas is right, in that respect, the next question is: are there 
any other psychological factors that can explain why most de-
fendants accept pleas? Otherwise, the descriptive utility of the 
psychological factors is low because the vast majority of defend-
ants accept plea deals.162 This is exactly the criticism that Rus-
sell Covey levied on Bibas’s argument. 
B. THE MARGINAL UTILITY OF USING COGNITIVE PRINCIPLES TO 
DESCRIBE PLEA BARGAIN DECISION-MAKING 
Covey argues, rightly, that if all of the psychological factors 
discussed by Bibas describe a trial tendency, the sheer fact that 
over ninety percent of defendants accept guilty pleas163 calls the 
utility of those factors into question.164 In other words, the psy-
chological factors that Bibas suggests affect plea bargain deci-
sion-making cannot be that weighty or important because other-
wise more defendants would go to trial and reject the plea 
bargain. Covey writes: 
Most of the cognitive quirks and biases identified by researchers, such 
as loss aversion, overconfidence, overdiscounting, and self-serving bias, 
suggest that defendants should be consistently disinclined to plead 
guilty . . . . Were one to form predictions about plea bargaining based 
only on cognitive research, it would be logical to expect plea bargaining 
to be a rare occurrence. Of course, it is not.165 
Covey is right to be critical. If a theory or argument does not 
accurately describe reality, then it should be questioned and 
challenged, so that researchers can determine whether it is 
wholly incorrect or only has such a weak influence on decisions 
that there may be more important factors to consider. However, 
 
cite, or seem to know of McAllister and Bregman’s 1986 study on plea bargain-
ing decision-making, which is one of very few studies on the topic, and is espe-
cially unique because it assesses plea bargaining decision-making by hypothet-
ical criminal defendants. See McAllister & Bregman (Defendants), supra note 
126. 
 161. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2497 (explaining that “characteristics irrele-
vant to guilt” have significant influence on defendants’ sentences). 
 162. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 163. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 164. Covey (2007), supra note 121, at 215. Others have echoed this concern. 
See Oldfather, supra note 122, at 249–50 (“A straightforward application of the 
heuristics and biases literature leads to the conclusion that plea bargaining 
should occur only rarely. That, of course, does not accord with reality, in which 
plea bargaining accounts for the resolution of the vast majority of all criminal 
cases.”). 
 165. Covey (2007), supra note 121, at 214–15. 
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Covey implicitly argues, or at least assumes, that there are no 
other psychological concepts166 that may explain why the vast 
majority of defendants take plea deals.167 He goes on to assume 
that the criminal justice system’s design must thus be a stronger 
influence than any cognitive bias, and he misses the opportunity 
to uncover the potential utility of discounting to explain the high 
rates of plea acceptance. Instead, he reverts back to focusing on 
the actors that legal scholars know best: attorneys and judges. 
C. EXPERIMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE ANSWER TO PLEA 
BARGAINING PATTERNS IS BUILT INTO THE SYSTEM: FOCUS ON 
ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES 
Testing models of plea bargain decision-making without fo-
cusing on the central decision-maker, the defendant, oversimpli-
fies the decision-making process and implicitly treats the crimi-
nal defendant as a passive receiver of attorney recommendation. 
That may be true in aggregate, but it is yet another testable hy-
pothesis. As demonstrated in Part I,168 most experimental work 
on plea bargaining decision-making focuses on attorneys’ and 
judges’ perceptions rather than focusing on criminal defendants’ 
perceptions, which could be accomplished by surveying actual 
criminal defendants or by placing study participants in a crimi-
nal defendant’s shoes.169 Having participants imagine being in 
realistic and consequential scenarios has limitations, but there 
is some evidence that discounting of real and hypothetical re-
wards are not significantly different.170 Anchoring on the expe-
riences and perceptions of attorneys and judges, on the other 
 
 166. By detailing only the psychological concepts provided by Bibas and then 
concluding that “cognitive research” as a whole does not offer any insights to 
plea bargain decision-making, Covey relies on the assumption that Bibas has 
provided an exhaustive recounting of all cognitive research that may apply to 
plea bargaining. Id. at 214 n.5. 
 167. Notably, discounting may explain why most defendants accept the 
plea—because discounting patterns demonstrate a cognitive human preference 
for the immediate and certain option. See supra Part I.A; infra Part III. 
 168. See generally supra Part I.A.2 (explaining discounting and how it is 
measured). 
 169. See Bushway et al., supra note 15, at 732 (using survey responses from 
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges); McAllister & Bregman (Defend-
ants), supra note 126, at 106–08 (using psychology students as participants by 
asking them to imagine themselves as defendants in experiment one and as 
defense attorneys in experiment two). 
 170. Gregory J. Madden et al., Delay Discounting of Real and Hypothetical 
Rewards, 11 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 139, 143 
(2003) (“The strong positive correlation (r = .92) shown in Figure 3 demon-
strates, beyond the statistical tests provided above, that individual participants’ 
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hand, may be contributing to the overemphasis on charge-sen-
tence discounting and probability of conviction.171 Although trial 
is relatively undesirable to judges and attorneys because it uti-
lizes limited and valuable time and resources, it may also be un-
desirable for criminal defendants, because the delay and uncer-
tainty of trial provoke apprehension and a general inability to 
plan life decisions, for example, about family and employment. 
Importantly, experimentally testing attorneys’ and judges’ per-
ceptions of plea bargains addresses the pros and cons of trial for 
those actors in their professional capacity;172 however, individ-
ual criminal defendants likely do not, and arguably should not, 
care about judicial resources in and of themselves. Experimen-
tally assessing criminal defendants’ perceptions of the pros and 
cons of trial and the plea bargain may reveal more considera-
tions than just charge-sentence discounts and the probability of 
conviction. The focus on non-criminal defendant samples, or at 
least hypothetical criminal defendant samples, may be contrib-
uting to the focus on relatively few variables. 
The next Section provides an experimental paradigm that 
can be used to evaluate the shadow-of-trial model by assessing 
the influence of sentence discounting173 as well as explain how 
variables like delay until trial and probability of conviction at 
trial influence plea bargain decisions over and above a sentence 
discount. 
 
discounting rates were similar across the real- and hypothetical- reward condi-
tions.”). 
 171. Importantly, research has demonstrated significant differences be-
tween criminal defendant and attorney samples. See McAllister & Bregman 
(Defendants), supra note 126, at 109 (“Although severity of sentence was im-
portant in the decision making of defendants it had little impact on defense 
lawyers.”); see also supra Part I.C.2 (explaining experimental tests of the 
shadow-of-trial model). Compare Bushway et al., supra note 15 (suggesting the 
shadow-of-trial model predicts attorneys’ and judges’ responses), with Abrams, 
supra note 146 (explaining that the result of the criminal defendant sample 
suggests that they are not really getting deals).  
 172. For example, an important empirical question is how long attorneys 
take to evaluate a case’s evidence before communicating to the client his/her 
chances of conviction at trial. 
 173. See Easterbrook (2013), supra note 96, at 555 (discussing the use of 
sentence discounts “in exchange for a speedy plea” in United States v. Ruiz, 536 
U.S. 622 (2002)). 
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III.  PRESENTING THE BRIDGE’S KEYSTONE: 
CONNECTING DISCOUNTING TO PLEA BARGAINING   
Delay and probability discounting paradigms, like many 
other cognitive psychology and behavioral economics paradigms, 
place individual decision-makers at the center of focus. By meas-
uring under what conditions individuals take one option over an-
other, researchers can test legal scholars’ expert intuitions and 
hypotheses about plea bargaining. This Section directly applies 
the concepts of delay and probability discounting to the plea bar-
gaining context in order to outline a promising experimental par-
adigm, which evaluates the shadow-of-trial model (the influence 
of charge-sentence discounting) as well as recent arguments for 
the model’s expansion to include and more strongly weigh other 
variables. Section A applies delay and probability discounting to 
plea bargaining decisions, using paradigms that mirror the pro-
cedures used by traditional behavioral economics decisions re-
garding money. Section B explains how this application of delay 
and probability discounting provides scholars with the possibil-
ity to test (1) the influence of charge-sentence discount, which is 
the central variable in the shadow-of-trial model; and (2) 
whether the features of delay and probability that are inherent 
in comparing plea deals and trial affect decision-making of crim-
inal defendants. Section C outlines the limitations of using dis-
counting paradigms and potential future directions for experi-
mental and empirical explorations of plea bargain decision-
making. 
A. APPLYING DISCOUNTING TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ PLEA 
BARGAINING DECISIONS: PROCEDURE AND HYPOTHESES 
As set forth in Part I.A, the classic delay and probability dis-
counting paradigms ask participants to make a choice between 
two options (for example, $10 now or $20 in a month, in delay 
discounting, and $10 with 100% certainty or $20 with sixty per-
cent certainty in probability discounting).174 Overall, delay dis-
counting studies find that individuals prefer immediate out-
comes to delayed outcomes,175 and, probability discounting 
 
 174. See, e.g., Estle et al., supra note 32, at 914. 
 175. See, e.g., id.; Sara J. Estle et al., Discounting of Monetary and Directly 
Consumable Rewards, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 58, 58 (2007); Joel Myerson et al., Dis-
counting Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards: Processes and Traits, 24 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 619, 620 (2003) [hereinafter Myerson et al. (2003)]. 
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studies find that individuals prefer certain outcomes to uncer-
tain outcomes.176 In plea bargaining, the criminal defendant is 
choosing between a plea deal, which is both immediate and cer-
tain, and trial, which is delayed and uncertain.177 Thus, gener-
ally, researchers may hypothesize that participants in the pro-
posed study would accept pleas more as the probability of 
conviction and delay to trial increase. 
Mirroring traditional paradigms, the procedure for measur-
ing the impact of delay and probability discounting could be as 
follows: (1) randomly assign participants to a condition (for ex-
ample, fifty percent certainty of winning at trial, with that trial 
being six months away); (2) have participants read a vignette 
about committing a crime; and (3) ask participants to choose be-
tween a realistic plea deal and trial change/sentence for the 
crime in the vignette. Based on what participants choose, the 
certain and immediate option (that is, the plea deal) will fluctu-
ate to be more or less appealing with the goal that after enough 
of these choices, the participant will converge on an indifference 
point.178 For example, the participant could be first offered the 
following two options: 
 
 176. See, e.g., Du et al., supra note 26, at 479–80. 
 177. Recently, researchers have combined delay and probability discounting 
paradigms into a single task, making the choice: $400 right now for certain, or 
an eighty percent chance of $800 in six months. Ariana Vanderveldt et al., Dis-
counting of Monetary Rewards That Are Both Delayed and Probabilistic: Delay 
and Probability Combine Multiplicatively, Not Additively, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 148, 150 (2015). Their findings are consistent with studies assessing 
delay and probability discounting separately, with some added suggestion that 
probability discounting is more weighty or important in participants’ decisions. 
Furthermore, a critical reader may note that receiving money is different than 
receiving a criminal punishment, and they would be correct. However, the dif-
ferences are not insurmountable. First, although there seem to be some differ-
ences between gains and losses, see supra note 32, the general preferences for 
immediate and certain outcomes holds because the proportion of participants 
who chose immediate loss ranged between forty percent and eighty-five percent, 
supra Figure 1, and mean proportion of participants who chose immediate loss 
was over sixty percent, supra Figure 2. Myerson et al. (2016), supra note 32, at 
363–64. It is important to note that this study only evaluated delay discounting, 
and not probability discounting, but the field will likely be taking a closer look 
at probability discounting in the near future. Second, even if loss of money is 
different than loss of freedom (i.e., criminal punishment), performing the exper-
iment provides a direct test of this. After a few replicated studies, scholars could 
be relatively certain that there is, or is not a difference between the commodities 
of money and freedom in the context of losses. The key here is that the proposal 
is an experimental test that the discounting theory applies in a new context. 
The application of theory to a new context is thus acutely falsifiable. 
 178. This requires scaling criminal charge-sentence combinations by asking 
participants to rank a series of criminal charge-sentence combinations so that 
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Trial option with 5% chance of freedom at trial in 6 months (95% 
chance of being found guilty of a felony and sentenced to 8 months in 
prison) or a plea deal of 100% certainty of receiving a gross misde-
meanor, with a prison sentence of 60 days in jail, followed by 12 months 
probation.179 
If the participant takes the trial option, the plea option 
should be made more appealing (for example, gross misde-
meanor with prison sentence of thirty days with twelve months 
probation) in order to get the participant to switch to choosing 
the plea option.180 On the other hand, if the participant takes the 
plea option, the plea option should be made less appealing (for 
example, gross misdemeanor with a prison sentence of six 
months with two years probation) in order to get the participant 
to switch to choosing the trial option. Just like in the traditional 
delay and probability paradigms, the certain and immediate op-
tion should be the one that either gets more or less appealing. 




If criminal defendants’ plea bargain decisions are consistent 
with the traditional discounting findings, one would expect that 
as the probability of conviction at trial increases and/or the delay 
to trial increases the likelihood of a criminal defendant accepting 
the plea increases. Lastly, to test the impact of charge-sentence 
discounting, a post-conviction sentence (felony with eight-month 
prison sentence in Figure 3) could be manipulated. For example, 
participants could be randomly assigned to conditions with one 
 
you know which pleas are nicer/harsher than others. 
 179. As suggested in Part I.A, the probability of conviction can be changed 
in each decision tree, or this could be manipulated between subjects such that 
each participant only imagines a single scenario in which his/her chance of con-
viction is set and unchanging. 
 180. See Vanderveldt et al., supra note 177, at 150–51 (explaining that the 
participant’s subsequent choice included an adjusted amount of the smaller re-
ward, “based on the participant’s previous choice”). 
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year, five years, ten years, or twenty years as their post-convic-
tion sentences, and the difference in discounting between those 
conditions would quantify the extent of influence of a sentence 
discount (trial sentence minus plea bargain sentence offered). 
In sum, it is possible to apply the traditional delay and prob-
ability discounting paradigms to plea bargaining decision-mak-
ing in order to (1) test whether delay until trial and probability 
of conviction are important in plea bargaining decision-making; 
and (2) provide a consolidated experimental paradigm through 
which to test scholars’ accumulating hypotheses about what in-
fluences criminal defendants’ plea bargain decisions. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SHADOW-OF-TRIAL MODEL 
The shadow-of-trial model suggests that the looming charge 
and sentence motivates defendants to plead and the time invest-
ment incentivizes prosecutors to negotiate a mutually agreeable 
plea bargain with a lower charge or sentence than the one 
threatened at trial.181 The charge-sentence discount may be part 
of the equation in plea bargain decision-making, but delay until 
trial and probability of conviction have been relegated to the 
margins. This Section explains the theoretical importance of the 
experimental paradigm described in the previous Section. 
1. Traditional Charge-Sentence Discount 
The manipulation of post-conviction sentence would serve as 
an explicit test of the impact of charge-sentence discount. How-
ever, in order to execute the paradigm, researchers would have 
to conduct preliminary studies on people’s rankings and ratings 
of different realistic criminal charge and sentence combinations. 
For example, researchers would need to know whether a gross 
misdemeanor with twelve months of probation and 1000 hours 
of community service is more (or less) harsh than a gross misde-
meanor with thirty days in jail, served on weekends. Different 
realistic sentences may be viewed by different defendants as 
more (or less) harsh. Additionally, researchers need to know 
whether a gross misdemeanor with a moderately harsh sentence 
(for example, sixty days in jail, followed by twelve months of pro-
bation) is perceived as more (or less) harsh than a felony with an 
objectively less harsh sentence (for example, thirty days in jail, 
followed by twelve months of probation). Knowing which charge-
sentence combinations are ranked (or rated) as more (or less) 
 
 181. See supra Part I.B.3 and accompanying footnotes. 
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harsh would be integral for the titration procedure to work as 
designed, because the option that changes must be more (or less) 
appealing than the last option in order to converge on an indif-
ference point.182  
2. Measuring Two Marginalized Variables: Delay to Trial and 
Probability of Conviction 
Because the discounting paradigms outlined above present 
participants with two options with three differences (severity of 
charge-sentence, delay to conclusion, and probability), this 
model goes above and beyond the shadow-of-trial model by in-
cluding more variables and testing scholars’ accumulating intu-
itions about the factors that affect plea bargain decisions.183 
As mentioned in Part I.B, the shadow-of-trial model charac-
terizes the plea bargaining process as a contractual negotiation 
in which attorneys subtract from the trial charge-sentence out-
come (for example, gross misdemeanor with six months in jail) a 
fixed discount so that the plea deal results in a more appealing 
option for the criminal defendant in exchange for an acceptance 
of guilt, waiver of trial, and various other waivers.184 The model 
underemphasizes factors other than this simple sentence dis-
count, or at least assumes those factors are not sufficiently influ-
ential in criminal defendants’ plea bargain decisions.185 The be-
havioral economics literature suggests that delay and 
probability are influential features in decision-making in other 
contexts; and, the discounting paradigms outlined above provide 
the means of testing whether delay to trial and perceived proba-
bility of conviction at trial have systematic effects on the crimi-
nal defendant’s choice separate from, and intersecting with, the 
criminal sentence or charge itself. Accordingly, the application 
of discounting paradigms to plea bargain decisions is a means of 
quantifying the effects of time and probability of conviction and 
giving it the proper weight in scholars’ evaluation of plea bar-
gaining utility and fairness, rather than letting the variables be 
relegated to the margins based on anecdotal evidence. 
 
 182. See supra Part I.A.3 (using monetary values, which allows for options 
that are obviously more or less appealing than others, to explain the titration 
procedure). 
 183. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465 (noting time discounting); see 
also supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting probability of conviction). 
 184. Klein et al., supra note 54, at 76. 
 185. Bibas, supra note 16, at 2465. 
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Furthermore, the potentially central role of delay to trial 
and probability of conviction in the plea bargain decision-making 
process may explain why plea acceptance rates are so high186—
because of the preferences for immediate and certain out-
comes.187 As such, discounting paradigms are the answer to 
Covey’s desire for cognitive principles that shed light on the ma-
jority of cases.188 Although behavioral economics research on dis-
counting suggests that the preferences for certain and immedi-
ate outcomes are relatively universal and robust, successfully 
applying the paradigms to a plea bargaining scenario would be 
a convincing demonstration of its generalizability. Additionally, 
the general preference for certain and immediate outcomes may 
even explain why people who are innocent, when confronted with 
this dichotomous decision, take the plea deal. This general pref-
erence for certain and immediate outcomes may combine with 
an innocent’s worries about serving the full trial sentence or, in 
extreme cases like Phillip Bivens’s, being sentenced to death.  
Lastly, this model provides conceptual grounding to explain 
how specific aspects of the plea bargaining decision affect either 
delay to trial, probability of conviction, or both. For example, bail 
and pretrial detention rules may systematically influence the 
importance of delay to trial in the decision: if a defendant has to 
wait six months in detention for trial, those six months are much 
less appealing than six months on bail, living life relatively nor-
mally. In the latter case, delay to trial may not be that important 
to defendants aside from apprehension they may feel. Variables 
like strength of evidence, attorney time and resources, and at-
torney method of communication regarding odds of conviction 
may all influence a defendant’s perception of the probability of 
his/her conviction at trial. Thus the discounting paradigm pro-
vides a theoretical explanation of how variables outside the tra-
ditional shadow-of-trial model, mentioned by Bibas and others, 
may influence the plea bargaining decision-making process by 
making delay to trial or probability of conviction more salient. 
 
 186. Plea acceptance rates are ninety-seven percent and ninety-four percent 
in federal and state cases respectively. Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges 
in the ‘Bazaar ’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html; 
Mears supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 187. Myerson et al. (2003), supra note 175, at 620. 
 188. Interestingly, the discounting paradigms, if supported, would counter 
the effects of the psychological processes that Bibas explores because he pro-
posed that they were trial tendencies. See supra Part II.A. 
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In sum, discounting paradigms provide a step toward pro-
ducing original data to test (1) whether the shadow-of-trial 
model’s emphasis on charge-sentence discount is too narrow; and 
(2) whether the criminal justice system’s design (two options 
with differences in delay and probability) systematically influ-
ences rates of plea bargain acceptance via the general human 
preference for certain and immediate outcomes.  
C. DISCOUNTING’S LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
Like any other experimental paradigm, discounting as ap-
plied to plea bargaining has limitations. First, in the outlined 
study, participants would be imagining themselves confronted 
with a choice between accepting a plea bargain or going to trial, 
and there is mixed evidence about whether the consequentiality 
of the commodity differentially affects real and hypothetical de-
cisions.189 Second, asking participants a series of questions does 
not perfectly mirror a real criminal defendant’s plea bargain de-
cision because the latter group makes a single decision. How-
ever, in applied experimental work, there is often a delicate bal-
ance between internal and external validity190—the discounting 
paradigms are useful because of the robust results. If and when 
they are applied to plea bargaining, the results will likely inform 
more realistic studies in the future. Third, when experimental 
paradigms assign participant guilt or innocence, it is difficult to 
generalize to real cases because true guilt/innocence is relatively 
uncertain and unascertainable, except in the rare case of DNA 
exonerations. Fourth, participants may not respond to a simple 
vignette in a way that is realistic because they are not actually 
concerned that they will be criminally punished. While this lim-
itation is a legitimate concern, realistic hypothetical scenarios 
are the best option to allow for experimentation because ethi-
cally and constitutionally, researchers cannot manipulate which 
 
 189. Anton Kühberger et al., Framing Decisions: Hypothetical and Real, 89 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1162, 1171 (2002) 
(“While our results are encouraging for the piecemeal validity of hypothetical 
decisions, we still lack a comprehensive theory of why in some cases hypothet-
ical decisions match real decisions and in other cases they do not . . . . Without 
such a theory the whole advantage of hypothetical decision research is nullified 
because for each question to be answered by a hypothetical decision experiment 
the results have to be validated by an accompanying real decision experiment.”). 
 190. Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Rog, Applied Research Design: A Practical 
Approach, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 
3, 12 (Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Rog eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
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criminal defendant gets what plea deal. Fifth, if researchers ma-
nipulate multiple levels of delay (one, two, four, six, ten month(s) 
to trial) and probability of conviction (twenty-five percent, 
thirty-three percent, fifty percent, seventy-five percent, and 
ninety-five percent) the sample size required will be large, which 
requires time and resources to complete. 
After the experimental study suggested by this Note is com-
pleted, and assuming the hypotheses are supported, future re-
search can explore many follow-up questions: (1) how does case 
evidence strength affect attorneys’ evaluations of the probability 
of conviction, attorneys’ recommendations communicated to 
their clients, and the final defendant decisions;191 (2) how do pre-
trial detention and bail affect the results; (3) how do demo-
graphic and other psychological factors like impulsivity, delay of 
gratification, race, gender, and education interact with attorney 
communication style and degree of time and resources to affect 
these decisions; (4) how do steep mandatory minimums affect 
plea bargaining acceptance rates;192 (5) how does the difference 
between trial and plea bargain charge-sentence combinations af-
fect decisions—maybe it is the distance between the two options 
that matters more than the other features; and (6) is there a 
threshold difference that makes it virtually impossible to refuse 
the plea deal? This research has the potential to add experi-
mental and empirical rigor to the analysis of plea bargaining. 
Most importantly, if the features of trial (its delay and uncer-
tainty) are found to be systematically aversive such that they 
influence criminal defendants to accept plea bargains, then this 
cognitive preference for immediate and certain options may be a 
finger on the scales of justice for all criminal defendants, includ-
ing innocent defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note starts by describing two currently separated lit-
eratures: plea bargaining in legal scholarship and discounting in 
behavioral economics. Developments in the literature suggest 
the beginnings of a conceptual bridge between the two litera-
tures. However, interdisciplinary experimental research is still 
 
 191. This would add the more realistic complexity to Bushway and Redlich’s 
2012 paradigm. See Bushway & Redlich, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 192. Discounting studies utilizing monetary outcomes suggest discounting 
rates are different for different amounts of money. See, e.g., Estle et al., supra 
note 32, at 918. 
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lacking. Moreover, the nature of the plea bargain decision op-
tions—a guilty plea, which is certain and immediate, or trial, 
which is uncertain and delayed—lends itself to be studied using 
the discounting paradigms. Furthermore, the traditional law 
and economics conception of plea bargaining makes behavioral 
economics paradigms like discounting particularly promising be-
cause the two fields are conceptually connected, and these para-
digms explicitly test legal scholars’ assumptions.  
This Note makes the case for the use of discounting para-
digms to experimentally test the influence of two features that 
are underemphasized by the shadow-of-trial model: delay to trial 
and probability of conviction. Once scholars have a better under-
standing of plea bargain decision-making (and the factors influ-
encing those decisions), they will be better prepared to evaluate 
its fairness and implement change if appropriate. Focusing on 
experimental evidence may reveal that the very structure of the 
plea bargain choice unwittingly takes advantage of the underly-
ing human preferences for certain and immediate outcomes. 
This results in a very efficient criminal justice system—if effi-
ciency is defined as concluding cases with minimal time, money, 
and effort. This very design may violate contract law’s require-
ment of a “free, informed, and rational” choice, especially for cer-
tain subpopulations, if not for all criminal defendants.193 Exper-
imental and empirical evidence should serve as the guiding light 
in assessments of plea bargaining—constitutional rights should 
not be relegated to the shadows. 
 
 193. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 70, at 1918. 
